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In this paper I shall argue that an account can be given of the 
sense of duty without reference to such specifically philosophical 
notions as "moral law," "moral rule," "moral principle," and "moral 
intuition." By shifting out of this vocabulary into talk about social 
roles, role expectations, and role modulations, attention is directed 
away from an attempt to justify people's moral judgments by 
demonstrating their consistency with those principles--an attempt that 
is likely, in view of the immense diversity of these judgments, to be 
unsuccessful and to have, at best, only an intellectual interest--and 
turned in a direction that, more modestly, concentrates on the kind of 
small-scale theory that helps us understand a little better how moral 
attitudes, moral judgments and moral changes occur. 
In order to illustrate the effect of the shift from a moral-
principles language to a social-roles language I give two sketches of 
how small-scale theory might develop--a suggestion about the nature of 
moral commitment and a suggestion about the causes of moral change. 
These features of the moral life are closely interrelated, inasmuch 
as, on the one hand, a principal element in the production of moral 
change is some innovator's commitment to the change in question. And, 
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on the other hand, commitment, whether this be commitment to change or 
to the status quo, emerge in the context of very specific types of 
expectations for role behavior, which I will describe. 
I may as well say at the outset that, since I think the 
differences between people who prefer a moral-principles language and 
those who prefer a social-roles language are of the deep kind that I 
call differences in world view,l I do not expect the discussion that 
follows to convince those who are not initially sympathetic. But I do 
hope it will at least make the position more persuasive to the already 
persuadea. 
I. 
My approach is Humean--not in the sense that I will be tracking 
any actual discussion by Hume, for Hume did not make the move I am 
going to make, but in the sense that I use Hume's discussion of natural 
necessity as a model for an analysis of obligation, or moral necessity. 
I shall argue that the latter, like the former, so far from being a 
feature of the world around us, is a feature of ourselves as observers 
of, responders to, that world. 
According to Hume, then, the 
idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of 
similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these 
events •• But there is nothing in a number of instances, 
different from every single instance, which is supposed to be 
exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar 
instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of 
one event, to expect its usual attendant •• •• 2 
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If I release my grip on a rock which I am holding in my hand, there is 
no reason why it should fall, and so no logical justification for my 
bel1eving that it will fall. It might just as well, as far as the 
nature of things goes, fly upward into the air or burst out singing 
"Rock of Ages Cleft for Me." But as a matter of fact, it has never 
leapt into the air or burst into song; it has always fallen. Because 
it has always fallen, I expect it to fallon the next similar occasion, 
and I mistakenly attribute my expectation--which is only a sUbjective 
feeling in me--to a natural necessity in the physical world. 
Physics dissolves into natural history; it is a record of how 
things happen to have behaved on the occasions when, and in the places 
where, scientists have been in a position to observe them. The so-
called laws of physics (e.g., the law of gravity) are no more than 
observed regularities to which we have attached a feeling of 
expectation. This expectation, "which we feel in the mind, this 
customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual 
attendant," is the sole source of "the idea of power or necessary 
connexion.,,3 
So far Hume. A similar, and as I think even more persuasive, 
account can be given of moral necessity--more persuasive because though 
moral laws still have a grip on some people's minds, they hardly have 
the social cachet that they, along with physical laws, once had. In 
Kant's day almost everyone would have agreed with him that the 
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onus probandi lay on anyone who, like Hume, challenged the physical a 
priori. In the Age of Reason that was also true of the moral a priori, 
but the onus has now probably shifted from challenger to defender. 
However that may be, my thesis is quite simple. It is that the 
duty people feel to perform such-and-such acts does not arise from the 
nature of those acts, for ~ act that is frequently repeated in the 
appropriate circumstances will come to be experienced as entailing an 
obligation to perform it. Rather, it arises from the fact that the act 
in question has been repeated often enough for people to count on it's 
being performed again in similar circumstances. Thus, if physics 
dissolves into natural history, moral theory dissolves into social 
psychology. 
The key words here are "act" and "in the appropriate 
circumstances." In the first place, then, it is important to 
distinguish between events (e.g., a knee jerk) and acts (e.g., kicking 
a punt). Hume's argument, as he himself formulated it, applied to any 
and all behavioral regularities. My expansion of his argument applies 
only to behaviors where the observed regularities result frout (or are 
thought to result from) some voluntary act. 
Thus the sphere of moral expectations, in distinction from 
those nonmoral expectations regarding nature which Hume discussed in 
the Treatise and the Enquiry, is the sphere of the voluntary. A 
physician who taps a patient's knee with a rubber hammer expects the 
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knee to jerk; if it does not he may be surprised or alarmed, but he 
does not blame the knee or the patient. If a patient fails to keep an 
appointment, the physician mayor may not be surprised, but in either 
case he will blame the patient so long as he believes the patient could 
have kept the appointment had he chosen to do so. As the line between 
the natural and the voluntary shifts, so the sphere of moral 
expectations also shifts. Animists commonly praise or blame nature for 
behaviors that nonanimists would neither praise nor blame, because they 
attribute those behaviors to the intentional acts of spirits. And 
consistent behaviorists, if there are any, blame a patient for a broken 
appointment no more and no less than they blame a knee for its failure 
to respond to a tap. 
Assuming, then, that people generally allow a sphere of the 
voluntary, even though they may bound it differently, we have now to 
describe the particular kinds of circumstances within that sphere in 
which specifically moral expectations arise. As an example, consider a 
new dean who has come into office after the long "reign" of an 
autocratic predecessor. Uncertain what will be acceptable to the 
faculty, he seeks, and accepts, the advice of the department heads on 
an administrative appointment that he must soon make. This creates an 
expectation, however slight, on the part of the department heads that 
they will be consulted, and that their advice will be taken, regarding 
subsequent administrative appointments--something they would certainly 
never have expected from his predecessor. Perhaps it also creates a 
slight expectation on the part of the dean that he will again consult 
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them, an idea that would never have crossed the mind of his 
predecessor. If he does consult them again this strengthens both the 
department heads' and the dean's own expectations that the group will 
be consulted. In due course, what was initially experienced merely as 
an expectation of future decanal behavior comes to be experienced, 
merely because the expectation has been repeatedly satisfied, as 
decanal duty--not merely something that he does but something that he 
ought to do. 
This is a case in which a defeated expectation generates 
indignation. And if the dean has internalized these expectations he 
will feel the same weight of censure (self-blame), whenever he fails to 
consult the department heads, that the department heads level against 
him. Social censure and self-blame operate powerfully to induce the 
dean to satisfy, and in satisfying to strengthen, the department heads' 
expectations, and eventually the practice of consultation will be 
incorporated in the by-laws of the faculty and approved by the 
trustees. It is practice, then, and the expectations arising from that 
practice that make it binding on the dean to consult the department 
heads. His autocratic predecessor certainly never consulted them, and 
nobody so much as dreamed that he ought to. Without anyone quite 
realizing it, and certainly without anyone deliberately planning it, 
the governance of the university has undergone a sea change. 
But clearly not every defeated expectation generates 
indignation. If the dean regularly arrives in his office at 9:00 a.m. 
people who have business with him--not only his secretaries but all 
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those department heads--will soon come to expect him to arrive at that 
hour and will plan their own day accordingly. If some day he does not 
turn up until noon they will doubtlessly be annoyed, but they will 
hardly feel indignation. What, then, are the differences in the social 
contexts of these two expectations that lead people to feel indignation 
when one of them is frustrated and only annoyance when the other is 
frustrated? 
Before tackling this question I shall summarize the main 
features of this Humean reduction: 
Every social role (e.g., those of dean, of department heads, of 
physician, of patient) consists in a set of specific behavioral 
responses (Rl , R2 , R3 ••• ) in specific social circumstances (C l , C2 , 
C3 ••• ). What the specific response in any specific circumstance is, 
depends on a variety of factors (e.g., the age, temperament and 
experience of the agent). But the occurrence of response Rl , whatever 
it happens to be, in circumstance Cl , creates, both in the agent and in 
those with whom he is interacting, a slight expectation that when Cl 
recurs he will again do Rl • Every repetition of Rl in Cl strengthens 
this expectation. 
Further, behavioral responses in certain, as yet unspecified, 
social situations come to be experienced not merely as expected but as 
morally compelling, just as expectations generated by repeated 
occurrences of natural events come to be experienced as physically 
necessary. But the necessity--physical in the case of natural events, 
moral in the case of social behaviors--is not in the events or the 
behaviors. Those are just whatever they are. The necessity in both 
cases is something "we feel in the mind" as a result of regularities 
that we have observed. 
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On this view, then, moral principles, moral rules and moral 
laws are simply generalizations about some common features of some 
social roles. To say that truth-telling, for instance, is a moral 
principle is to make the empirical assertion (which is subject to 
falsification) that over a great sweep of human history a common 
feature of many different social roles has been an expectation that the 
role players in all these roles will tell each other the truth. 
II. 
This account is likely to be resisted by moral philosophers and 
all those who, whether philosophers or not, are disposed to believe in 
moral absolutes. In the rest of this paper I shall (1) try to meet 
what I think are the main--they are certainly typical--objections to 
the reduced view that I have put forward, and at the same time (2) 
spell out the specific features of those social contexts which give 
rise to expectations that are experienced as morally, rather than as 
merely socially, compelling. 
It will perhaps be allowed that I have given a not implausible 
account of how social norms emerge and why they have whatever force 
they have. But moral norms, it will be said, are different, and my 
account does not begin to explain their nature or their authority. 
What, then, is a moral norm? What, for that matter, is a norm? A norm 
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is an instruction to a role player that playing this role well calls 
for him to act in such-and-such a way in such-and-such circumstances. 
Thus there is a norm for the dress of physicians, and there is a 
(different) norm for the dress of auto mechanics. Though both of these 
norms allow for considerable variation in costume, for physicians or 
mechanics to venture beyond this tolerated range of variation exposes 
them to censure. They are subject to this censure for no other reason 
than because people have come to expect physicians to dress in such-
and-such a way and mechanics to dress in such-and-such a different way, 
and people have come to expect them to dress in these ways for no other 
reason than because they have in fact dressed in these ways. 
Physicians' dress and mechanics' dress change over time; as their dress 
changes the norm, doubtlessly lagging a little, changes too. That is, 
people come--but not everybody at the same time--to expect all 
physicians and all mechanics to dress in the new ways, whatever they 
are, and so censure those who are slow in accommodating to the new 
norms. 
Everyone, presumably, will agree about this; nobody, 
presumably, is made uneasy by the relativity of social norms--e.g., the 
norms for dress--to the actual behaviors of actual people in actual 
social settings. The question is why the same sort of account should 
not be given of those norms which people who believe in moral norms 
call moral norms--for instance, the norm that physicians should not lie 
to their patients and that auto mechanics should not lie to the people 
who have brought their cars in for repair? What is the difference 
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between the norm, "Wear a white jacket during your consulting hours" 
and the norm, "Tell your patient the truth about the gravity of his 
illness"? Certainly one obvious difference is the intensity of 
people's reactions to the violation of a norm. When the violation is 
merely ridiculed or only mildly censured (someone eats peas with his 
knife) the norm is called a social norm; when the violation is severely 
censured it is called a moral norm. 
Thus there is indeed a difference between social norms and 
moral norms, but it is not a difference between the kinds of norms they 
are, only a difference between the kinds of responses people make to 
norm-violation. Moral norms, that is to say, are not sui generis; they 
are just those norms, whatever they happen to be, about which, for 
whatever reasons, one feels strongly. In this country at this time 
good manners, including eating peas with one's fork, are only social 
norms--if, indeed, they are still that. Nobody attaches much 
importance to them, even those who are punctilious about following 
them. But in other countries at other times, good manners are 
immensely important; they are marks of, and so help maintain, the class 
distinctions on which those societies are based. For someone like the 
Duchesse de Guermantes good manners not only mattered a great deal; 
they were all that mattered, and Marcel's failure to distinguish 
between bowing to her in the Opera-Comique and bowing to her in the 
street 4 was as serious, really, as would be the failure of a game 
keeper to distinguish between, say, shooting pheasants and shooting 
peasants--except for the fact that the silly old Republic made an issue 
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of it. Or take the hullabaloo over the recent disclosure that the 
Princess of Wales apparently does not address her husband as "Sir." 
Elderly upper class Englishmen may feel strongly about this; if they do 
it is because they see it not as an isolated solecism but as evidence 
that the world is going to pieces. 
In a word, we can now specify one feature of the kind of social 
context in which a norm violation generates moral indignation rather 
than annoyance. If the violated norm is taken as symbolic of a whole 
way of life, one in which the people concerned have a very large 
investment, or if it is believed that the norm protects those people 
from some serious harm, violation of it is likely to produce a strong 
enough response for what would otherwise be merely a social norm to 
become a moral norm. Thus twenty years or less ago smoking in public 
places, so far from violating any social norm, conformed to one and was 
consequentially admired. More recently smoking has come to conflict 
with a new social norm and so is censured. Indeed, so heated and so 
widespread is the indignation over the adverse effects of smoking on 
the lungs of nonsmokers that it is moving rapidly toward becoming the 
violation of a moral, not a merely social, norm. Thus norms are 
context-relative: What is a social norm at ti for II may be a moral 
norm for him at t2 and a moral norm for 12 at ti' 
But unless all indignation is moral indignation there must be 
some second feature of those social contexts that elicit specifically 
moral responses to defeated expectations. Let us assume, then, that 
the indignation felt by elderly Englishmen when they learn the Princess 
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of Wales does not address her husband as "Sir" is correctly described, 
however intense that indignation may be, as social indignation, and 
that the indignation felt by the department heads when the dean ceases 
to consult them regarding appointments, even though their indignation 
may not be particularly intense, is correctly described as moral. What 
difference in social context makes these two cases different? 
In order to understand the difference, notice, first, that we 
constantly read other people's behavior for their intentions, in the 
same way that we read their letters for the messages they contain, and 
we may discover that we have misread their behavior in the same way 
that we may discover we have misread their letters. Someone extends 
his right arm from his side; we read this as an intention to admire the 
quality of our new jacket. Instead, his arm continues to move up 
towards his face--we see that his intention is to remove his glasses. 
We are mildly embarrassed, possibly disappointed, but we are not 
indignant. Moral indignation is one's response when the reading and 
misreading involve a particular kind of intention, the intention to 
cooperate. Moral indignation occurs when (1) we have read a bit of 
someone else's behavior as meaning an intention to cooperate, (2) that 
person's cooperation would help us and his failure to cooperate would 
harm us, (3) it turns out we have misread it--it was not an intention 
to cooperate, and (4) we believe our original reading was justified--
the other person constructed his behavior carelessly, he changed his 
mind in mid-stream without warning us, or he wanted us to misread it. 
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So much in general. To return now to our examples, the 
difference between the Princess of Wales case and the department heads 
case is this. On the one hand, the Princess of Wales had done nothing 
that would lead anyone--neither the Prince nor the elderly Englishmen--
to believe that, because she had called the Prince "Sir" before she 
married him, she intended to call him "Sir" when she became his wife--
marriage from her point of view was a difference that made all the 
difference. On the other hand, repeated consultation had led the 
department heads to believe that a tacit commitment had been made--on 
the basis of prior experience they had discounted the dean's 
injunction, "Don't take this as a precedent." When we are dealing with 
another person rather than with merely inanimate nature, we believe 
that his behavior means something, and that it means to him pretty much 
what it means to us. If we didn't believe this we would never seek to 
interact with people; we would merely react to their behavior, as we 
react to a stone that is falling in our direction. In the case of 
people, in contrast to stones we of course observe behavior, but we do 
so in order to be able to infer intentions, and we respond, not to the 
behavior, but to what we take those intentions to be. 
When it is a matter of inferring, or reading, the intentions of 
people involved in any sort of joint activity--Hume's example of two 
men, each with an oar, engaged in rowing a boat is a good one--each 
party is likely to read the other's behavior as showing an intention to 
continue the activity that is under way. Thus the expectation that 
somebody intends to go on doing something (which is different from, and 
stronger than, the mere expectation that he will do it) occurs when 
some joint activity is under way. The possibility of social life 
depends on most people developing this kind of expectation in most 
situations involving joint activity; clearly, cooperation cannot wait 
on the successful negotiation of explicit contracts. 
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Three further comments: First, there may be disagreement among 
the participants about whether the pattern of behavior in which they 
are involved is, or is not, a pattern of cooperation. The department 
heads, believing that the dean's behavior in consulting them fits the 
pattern of cooperation, are indignant when he ceases to consult. He, 
however, may see his behavior as fitting the learning-to-do-my-job 
pattern, in which case his behavior does not in the least commit him to 
consult once he has gained the experience he thinks he needs. Here 
again, then, what is a social norm for II at tl may be a moral norm for 
12 at tl and, quite possibly, a moral norm for II at t2" 
In cases of this kind much depends on whether one party to the 
disagreement can persuade the other that his understanding of the 
other's behavior was warranted. If the dean persuades the department 
heads that he never meant to cooperate and that their eagerness to 
participate in decisionmaking has led them to over-read his intentions, 
their indignation is likely to be dissipated, even though their 
disappointment may remain intense. Or if they, in their turn, convince 
him that his behavior, however unintentionally, justified their 
understanding of it, he is likely to feel some obligation to consult 
them. The critical question for each party, then, is the other party's 
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intentions: Did he mislead me, or did I misread him? If the two 
parties cannot agree about whether it is a case of misleading or of 
misreading their dispute may have to be referred to the courts, which, 
over the centuries, have developed rules for deciding whether such-and-
such a verbal expression means that an understanding exists. 
Second, explicit promises and formal contracts (the verbal 
expressions on which courts focus attention) do not underlie 
cooperation and "justify" it. On the contrary, at the human level of 
social organization the very notions of promising and of contracting 
depend on expectations that cooperation has already generated, 
expectations that we can see operating in societies far too simple to 
have conceived the notions of promise-keeping and contracting, let 
alone to have formulated explicit rules. But of course, once promise-
keeping and contracting emerge as social institutions they provide 
alternative routes to commitment. And because people on the whole 
keep promises and fulfill contracts, violations of them occasion moral 
indignation just as does a simple failure to continue cooperation once 
it has begun. 
Third, cooperation does not actually have to begin for one 
party to understand that the other means to cooperate. If you sit down 
beside me in the boat and pick up an oar I read you as intending to 
join me in rowing, before you have so much as dipped your oar into the 
water. And even if this patient has never before made an appointment 
with this physician, so that the physician has no reason, based on 
prior experience with this patient, to expect him to be punctual, the 
physician knows--and the patient presumably knows--that the role of 
physician and the role of patient involve cooperation at many points, 
including the making and keeping of appointments. It is enough, in a 
word, if the actual behavior (telephoning, asking for an appointment, 
accepting it) fits, in memory or in anticipation, the pattern of 
cooperation. 
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In a word, moral indignation arises not when just any 
expectation happens to have been defeated but when the expectation is 
one based on one's understanding of another person's intention to 
cooperate. But once again what distinguishes a moral norm from a 
social norm is not a feature of the world; it is only something "felt 
in the mind," in this case the indignation felt when one realizes that 
what one had supposed to be a mutual understanding to cooperate was not 
one. 
III. 
But even if it be allowed that I have correctly described the 
feeling that is aroused when a moral norm is violated, and correctly 
specified the circumstances in which this feeling is aroused, many 
philosophers will argue that my account ignores what to them is the 
all-important difference between feeling obliged and being obliged. 
What distinguishes moral norms from social norms is not a difference in 
feeling but that fact that, whereas social norms are, all of them, 
embedded in roles and so change as the roles change, moral norms are 
independent of roles and so do not change as roles change. My account, 
that is, does not, and cannot, account for the categorical nature of 
moral rules, or principles, such as the duty to tell the truth, the 
duty to keep promises, and the duty to treat human life as sacred. 
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My reply is that a moral principle is simply an expectation 
that has been abstracted from all of the roles in which it is actually 
embedded. Behaviors that are specific to one and only one role (such 
as addressing one's husband as "Sir") are not likely to be abstracted 
from the social role of which they are a part, but behaviors that are 
expected in many different roles are easily abstracted and so 
considered apart from any and all roles; they then seem to be, as 
philosophers say, "universally" binding. In a word, because these 
expectations have been abstracted from their concrete settings in 
specific roles, they seem to philosophers to have an obligatory force 
that puts them in opposition to, and gives them a moral priority over, 
any and all of the roles in which these expectations are actually 
embedded. 
But ordinary people, who may go along with this view as long as 
it is stated in general terms, recognizes that the philosophers' moral 
principles are context-relative as soon as they are face to face with 
a concrete situation in which they have to make a decision. They at 
once put truth-telling, promise-keeping and the other so-called moral 
principles back into the various roles from which the philosophers 
have abstracted them. That is, people commonly take into account the 
specific social role they happen to be performing at the time they find 
they have to choose, for instance, between lying and telling the truth. 
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A university president who on occasion lies to his faculty 
without a qualm (he would probably describe it to himself as fudging a 
bit; "lying" is an ugly word) might not for a moment consider lying to 
his wife or children. A physician who would tell the truth about a 
very gloomy prognosis to a young man with family responsibilities (he 
would say that the young man needs to get his affairs in order) might 
lie to an elderly patient with the same prognosis ("Let him die in 
peace"). And so on. 
Thus when a norm ("Do not lie") is contemplated from a distance 
it may very well look universal, categorical, role-transcendant; seen 
from a distance it has a halo around it. But as one moves close up in 
order to decide whether to follow it or to violate it in this or that 
particular situation, it turns out very much to have a series of local 
habitations, that is, to be as context-relative as any so-called social 
norm. The only difference is that it happens to be a norm that has a 
local habitation in several different roles. This explains why the 
violation of a moral norm is commonly regarded as graver than the 
violation of a social norm: expectations regarding a norm associated 
with several roles will have a greater weight than expectations 
regarding a norm associated with but a single role. 
But my examples of university presidents and physicians do not 
begin to reflect the actual diversity of norms or the relativity of 
norms to social context. For my examples are drawn from the 
expectations of upper-middle class, late twentieth century Americans 
for the behavior of late twentieth century professional people. And 
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even here, within a relatively small and seemingly homogeneous social 
class, a consensus on verbal formulas (for instance, "Lying is wrong," 
"Life is sacred") may mislead. It is like the virtual unanimity of the 
affirmative answers to a pollster's question, "Do you want peace?" (or 
"lower taxes?" or "a balanced budget?"), as long as the answerers never 
consider what they might have to sacrifice for peace, lower taxes or a 
balanced budget. 
Thus moral philosophers are a bit myoptic. They also tend to 
be both ethnocentric and class-centric. They not only focus their 
attention on Western society and largely ignore non-Western societies; 
even within Western society they concentrate on the opinions of 
philosophers, theologians, jurists and other highly respectable people, 
so that the norm "Life is sacred" looks much better established than it 
would look if the opinions of gangsters, ghetto residents, and CIA 
agents were also taken into account. 
Let me put this in a different way in order to bring out a 
second, but connected, point. A moral principle stands to the 
instructions that are embedded in a number of social roles in the way 
that "horse" stands to Dobbin and "cow" to Bossie. One can move up a 
ladder from lower-level principles to higher-level principles as one 
can move from "horse" and "cow" to "animal." In a word, moral 
philosophers construct taxonomies of moral principles much as botanists 
construct taxonomies of plants. These moral taxonomies correspond more 
or less closely to the instructions embedded in social roles--though we 
may suspect that the correspondence is less close than the 
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correspondence between a botanical taxonomy and the plant kingdom. 
It is a question what good these classificatory systems are. 
If one's interest in moral principles is at about the level of the 
interest of a man who breeds racers for people who want to win the 
Derby and hunters for people who ride to the hounds, the answer is, 
"Not much." On the other hand, abstract moral principle afford a 
harmless satisfaction to those who delight in system, order, and 
hierarchy, and they can be useful whenever people want the "good 
reasons" they give for whatever they are doing today to be consistent 
with the "good reasons" they gave yesterday for doing a quite different 
thing in seemingly similar circumstances--just as botanists can extract 
from a botanical taxonomy good reasons for calling two quite different 
looking plants "potentilla." 
Though one might, then, not particularly want to be a moral 
taxonomist oneself, one could no more object to moral taxonomies than 
to botanical ones, were there not so often a whiff of medieval realism 
about the former, which one detects much less often about the later. 
It may be that moral philosophers use "Lying is wrong" to refer to a 
set of similarities shared by a subset of instructions that occur in a 
number of otherwise different social roles--as botanists presumably use 
"potentilla" to refer to a subset of similarities shared by a subset of 
plants. But listen to sentences in which "moral principle" occurs. 
They have a quite different tone from sentences in which "potentilla" 
occurs, a tone that lifts moral principles out of the ordinary run of 
classes and suggests that they are important in some special way. The 
"moral principle" type of language is appealing, I think, because it 
slips an "ought" into an "is"--because in the twinkling of an eye it 
converts a class--which may have a very large number of members, but 
which is still only a class--into something transcendent and 
authoritative. 
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The term "universal" works the same magic. The notion of 
consensus gentium once appealed, and possibly still appeals, because a 
rule on which all mankind agrees has an authority that cannot be traced 
to political institutions or historical traditions, for these obviously 
vary from tribe to tribe; it must, then, have a "higher" source. 
Despite the fact that people today know rather more about the diversity 
of moral beliefs and practices than did the ancients, some of the aura 
surrounding the consensus gentium survives: magnifying a consensus has 
the advantage that dissenters from the consensus are diminished to an 
increasingly insignificant minority. From this point of view an almost 
complete consensus works as well as a complete consensus: it enables 
one to write off the minority as a lesser breed, deficient in some way 
because it fails to recognize the authority that everybody else 
recognizes. In a word, if the dissenters can be made to look not just 
like a minority but a very small minority, they can be treated not 
merely as statistical deviants but as moral deviants. Once more, a 
slippery transition has been made from "is" to "ought." 
It was Hume, so far as I am aware, who first noted this 
slippery transition. In a well known paragraph in the Treatise, which 
he introduced with characteristic--and studied--casualness, he wrote: 
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation which 
may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of 
morality which I have hitherto met with. instead of the 
22 
usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. 
This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last 
consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new 
relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be 
observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should 
be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely 
different from it. S 
If Hume is correct moral norms cannot be distinguished from 
"merely" social norms either by claiming that (1) moral norms, as 
abstractions, have unlimited scope ("Life is sacred"), whereas social 
norms, as concrete rules, have only limited scope ("Eating peas with a 
kn1fe is good manners among upper class people in the U.S. and the 
U.K."), or by claiming (2) that moral norms are universally 
acknowledged ("Only deviants fail to recognize that life is sacred"), 
whereas social norms are acknowledged only by relatively limited social 
groups ("Upper classes in the U.S. and the U.K., but not upper classes 
in China and Japan, acknowledge that eating peas with a fork is good 
manners"). For if there is a gap at all between "is" and "ought" then 
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there is just as much of a gap between an abstract "is" and an abstract 
"ought" as there is between a specific "is" and a specific "ought," and 
just as much of a gap between a universally acknowledged "is" and a 
universally acknowledged "ought" as there is between a restrictedly 
acknowledged "is" and a restrictedly acknowledged "ought." 
But is flume correct? I think he is certainly correct in 
holding that there is no conceivable way of getting from "is" to 
"ought," but the analysis in the first section of this essay, if it is 
correct, shows there is a straightforward causal relation between "is" 
and feelings of "ought," for the feeling of obligation is readily 
attached to the performance of any behaviors that are parts of well 
established social roles. 
This answer should satisfy flume; it is fully in accordance with 
his proposal to "introduce the experimental method of reasoning into 
moral subjects.,,6 But the moral philosophers to whose criticisms I 
have been replying will not be convinced. They will regard my own 
transition from "is" to feelings of "ought" as even more slippery than 
the one I accused them of making. They will say that the "ought" I 
have derived from "is" is not a real "ought"; it is just another "is"--
the "is" of a feeling of "ought." He are back to our starting point. 
In this imaginary debate between the moral philosophers and myself we 
have--alas!--been talking past each other the whole time. I shall 
therefore break off my attempt to meet the moral philosophers' 
objections to my Humean reduction by countering with some of the 
difficulties their own unreduced version of moral obligation 
encounters. Instead, I shall take a different tack and try to deal 
directly with the feeling, shared by many nonphilosophers, of course, 
that some acts are "right" and others "wrong," irrespectively of what 
people's social expectations for these acts are. I do not question 
the existence of a widespread belief that duties are independent of 
social roles, any more than Hume questioned the existence of the 
feeling of necessity, but I shall try to show that its existence 
depends on a context of unnoticed social expectations. 
IV. 
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It is widely believed, then, that people have an obligation to 
perform certain acts even if those acts are not elements in any social 
role whatever, indeed, even if those acts are directly antithetical to 
acts which important social roles require. Thus it is often said in 
criticism of nineteenth century Americans that they had a duty to 
preserve the life, liberty and property of Blacks before anybody--even 
the Blacks themselves--expected their lives, liberties and property to 
be preserved, and of twentieth century Germans that they had a duty to 
Jews even if (indeed, especially if) no social roles survived in Nazi 
Germany which incorporated rights for Jews. 
As long as this feeling of the seeming independence of duty 
from role expectations is taken to be veridical, i.e., as giving 
insight into the nature of things, the account that philosophers give 
of it--that its source can only be a set of ideal, transcendental 
norms--will seem plausible, and the reduced language that I am 
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recommending will seem inadequate. Accordingly, it is not enough for 
me to point out the difficulties in which the moral principles language 
is emeshed. I must give an account of this feeling--and it is a 
feeling--that shows that it too is dependent on social expectations, 
even in the hypothetical circumstances described, viz. even when there 
are no social expectations that support it. Or, to put this less 
paradoxically, I shall show that acts thought to be obligatory because 
they correspond to the requirements of some transcendental norm are all 
factually responses to the actual norms of a subgroup that is out of 
phase in some respect with the actual norms of the larger group of 
which it is a part. But for this answer to be convincing or even 
intelligible I must introduce the concept of role modulation. 
Viable societies exist at all, and have whatever stability they 
happen to have, only because most people most of the time have 
successfully internalized the social roles they find themselves 
playing. But human societies are not societies of ants; men and women 
don't internalize their roles that completely. They are constantly 
adjusting their behavior to the diverse and complex environments in 
which they play their roles--either to changed circumstances or to 
existing circumstances that they once ignored but that they have now 
come to regard as relevant to the role in question. 
A role, in other words, is not a straightjacket; it is more 
like a rather loosely fitting garment. To outsiders, who are wearing a 
different garment, this one may seem restrictive and unchanging. To 
those wearing it, it fits, on the whole, quite cOTIlfortably, even if, 
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here and there, it pinches a bit. People try to adjust it at the 
places where it pinches, opening up a seam here, taking one in there. 
Adjustments of this kind--modulations, I shall call them--are going on 
all the time. Accordingly, obligation, understood in the reduced way I 
have proposed, is not an all or none affair; it is rather a matter of 
differential weights that are attached to the norms that are embedded 
in, and that, collectively, form the role; and these differential 
weights vary over time. 
To understand obligation it is therefore necessary to attend as 
much to the concept of role modulation as to the concept of role, and 
it is important to remember that role modulations, usually small but 
sometimes large, are occurring all the time. A modulation is large if 
it looks large, and it looks large if it affects a norm that people 
think is important. It follows that a proposed large modulation 
usually raises what people call a "moral" issue, whilst proposed small 
modulations do not. 
Not all modulations succeed, of course. A modulation may 
disappear as soon as it is introduced--the introducer himself may not 
like the look of it when he sees it in action, or it may be defeated by 
the hostility of moral conservatives who hold, with the Harry 
Claverings of every generation in every society, that "No man has a 
right to be peculiar. Every man is bound to accept such usage as is 
customary in the world."l 
Modulations may be important or trivial, and those that are 
important for one society may be trivial for another. But all 
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modulations depend on a capacity to notice differences--differences 
which others, with less sensitive antennae, have overlooked but which, 
once noticed, are recognized by some community or other to be relevant. 
Thus Emma Woodhouse was one who had successfully internalized the role 
expectations for an early nineteenth century English gentlewoman; she 
perceived herself as--indeed, she was--a lady. When she poked rather 
cruel fun at poor, defenseless Miss Bates, Mr. Knightley, whose 
antennae were much more sensitive than Emma's, pointed out to her the 
disparity between the role of lady and her behavior on this occasion: 
"I cannot see you acting wrong, without a remonstrance. How could you 
be so unfeeling to Miss Bates? How could you be so insolent in your 
wit to a woman of her character, age, and situation?--Emma, I had not 
thought it possible." Though Emma "tried to laugh it off. she 
was most forcibly struck. The truth of his representation there was no 
denying. She felt it at her heart. ,,8 
Mr. Knightley's antennae picked up a relevant similarity 
between poor, dull Miss Bates and the better off, more attractive women 
to whom Emma would never have been rude; Emma perceived the similarity 
the moment it was pointed out to her, and saw that she had to extend 
the scope of the norm "lady" to the Miss Bateses of this world. 
(Perception of a relevant different among the women covered by the norm 
would have led to a reduction in its scope.) What I am calling the 
perception of a similarity (or dissimilarity) corresponds closely, I 
think, to what some moral philosophers call a moral intuition. As 
compared with "intuition," "perception" is a reduced term. I prefer it 
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for that reason: it deflects any tendency to regard the experience in 
question as a specially significant and veridical insight. Everyone 
agrees that "perceptions" may be mistaken; "perceptions" are also 
obviously relative to the perceiver's interests: a similarity that 
stands out prominently for one individual may be unnoticed by those who 
have other fish to fry. This applies as much to the perception of 
similarities (and dissimilarities) that are relevant to so-called moral 
norms as it does to similarities (and dissimilarities) that are 
relevant to so-called social norms. 
That is why I have brought Mr. Knightley, Emma, and Miss Bates 
into the discussion. Today that particular modulation, and the 
differentiations in the environment to which it was responsive will be 
viewed as trivial, though they were weighty for the social class of 
which Mr. Knightley, Emma, and Miss Bates were members. I have chosen 
it precisely because it seems trivial--to reinforce the point that 
there is no difference between the ways in which trivial and important 
modulations are introduced, and no difference in the ways in which they 
become established, if indeed they become established. Modulations 
that take on do so because they call people's attention to aspects of 
the situation that, now that they attend to them, seem to them to be 
relevant. These modulations become a part of the culture and are now 
detended as correct usage by all the Harry Claverings who, earlier, had 
condemned them as deviations. 
It took no more than self-assurance for Mr. Knightley to 
correct Emma. Modulators who propose large-scale modulations--Beecher 
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and his fellow abolitionists, for example--need courage as well, and a 
strong sense of rectitude. This is often, but not necessarily, 
supported by religious belief--the Quakers' inner light is a case in 
point. In any event, proposers of large-scale modulations 
characteristically have more confidence in their judgment than a 
careful survey of the available evidence would warrant. But for them 
of course, it isn't a matter of judgment or evidence. People put 
forward such large modulations as abolition of slavery, probably less 
because they have made a calculation of costs and benefits (though they 
may use such an argument ex post to justify the modulation), than 
because they feel deeply about it. 
Role modulators of this type--Iarge-scale modulators like 
Beecher and Martin Luther King--are not fundamentally different from 
small-scale modulators like Mr. Knightley. Both call attention to the 
fact that people outside some norm as it is currently understood 
(slaves; the Miss Bateses) are similar in an important respect to those 
inside the norm (human beings; ladies). Both point out that exclusion 
harms those who are excluded. Both feel strongly about the harm and 
try to communicate this feeling to others, whose changed behavior, if 
they are influenced by the modulator, will change the norm in the 
desired direction. 
O~ the other hand, large-scale modulators, unlike small-scale 
modulators, usually get involved in politics and should, therefore, be 
distinguished from the politicians--Lincoln, Johnson--with whom they 
become involved and who may preside over, and even participate in, the 
modulation the modulators are advocating. Politicians 
characteristically respond to the pressure of events, including the 
pressure exerted by modulators; they do not actively advocate a 
modulation well in advance of a substantial movement in its favor. 
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They are not risk-takers in the same sense that modulators are risk-
takers, and modulators who acquire public office are likely at the same 
time to acquire caution. 
Finally, modulators are usually admired only in the abstract 
and at a distance. It is generally recognized that a society in which 
there were, literally, no modulations at all would be an absolutely 
static society--not a human society at all. Hence the social utility 
of modulators is widely acknowledged. But what one wants is 
modulations that are occurring somewhere else, at some other time. 
Individual modulators, when they are close enough to have to be dealt 
with directly, are usually heartily disliked, for the obvious reason 
that one has to decide whether to accept the modulation they have 
proposed or to reject it. And most people find most modulators, again 
seen close-up, to be obsessive, intolerant, impatient, demanding--in a 
word, "difficult." 
If large-scale modulations are usually launched by individuals 
of the kind just described, these modulations, somewhere along the road 
to becoming established roles, are likely to be reinforced by the 
sanctions of courts and self-regulating bodies. But no such sanctions 
are likely to be introduced--still less to be sustained--unless they 
are based on substantial, spontaneous consensuses. Accordingly, the 
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key element in moral change is always a risk-taking decision by morally 
sensitive individuals, who, having perceived a failure of fit between 
an existing role and the situation in which they now have to act, seek 
to modulate the role accordingly.9 The spread of a modulation through 
a society, prior to its codification in institutional or legal forms, 
is quite like the spread of an esthetic innovation--a new style in art 
or in music. If the modulation, whether moral or esthetic, takes on, 
we may be sure that it has brought into focus some aspect of people's 
experiential field that is important to them and that was missed in the 
earlier, unmodulated formulation. 
It follows that when, in the reduced language I am using, one 
equates an obligation to do K with the social expectations for some 
role, one must take account of the fact that this role is constantly 
changing through time as people respond in various ways, and at various 
rates, to the various modulations proposed by various modulators. How 
does this affect the argument that, since some duties are at least some 
of the time independent of roles, obligation cannot be reduced to 
social expectation? Or, rather, how does this bear on the summary 
reply to this objection that I put forward at the beginning of this 
section? 
If one thinks of a role synchronically, as an "instantaneous" 
slice of time, the role is always stable and uniform; it changes only 
between successive synchronic slices. Looked at synchronically the 
role is stable, and everybody therefore has a well-defined duty: it is 
to conform his behavior to the norms set out for him in that role, and 
everybody knows what his duty is. (As a result of what used to be 
called weakness of will or for some other reason some people may fail 
to do their duty, but that is irrelevant, since failure to do one's 
duly implies that one has a duty to do.) 
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If one thinks diachronically things look very different. All 
sorts of modulations, large and small, are emerging, gaining adherents, 
losing them, gaining them again. • •• There is now no longer anything 
like an agreed-on set of expectations that completely determine every 
role player's duty. Instead, at any time a number of different sets of 
expectations are making claims against the role-players, some of whom 
are more responsive, some less responsive, some responsive in this 
respect, some in that respect, to the various claims. 
Even in the case of as simple a norm as the dress code for 
physicians, it is not the case, as we have already seen, that people 
wake up some morning to find that overnight the dress code has changed 
to white jackets from suit coats. Rather, it is the case that a rich 
patient has suggested to A that he would look well in a white jacket, 
that he has tried it and found that his patients do not resist too 
much; that B has heard of the change, and though he liked the idea, has 
settled more cautiously for modest gray instead of stark white; that C 
wears his suit coat under a white jacket; that D continues to wear his 
suit coat when he interviews patients in his office but puts on a white 
jacket to examine them. • • • What is true of the way in which this 
simple norm modulates is even more obviously true of the way a complex 
norm modulates, say, the norm that specifies eligibility for voting. 
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It is, therefore, an oversimplification to think of a sharp 
contrast between a lone modulator (say, the first abolitionist) and all 
the other role players, a monolithic block of slavery supporters who 
continue to feel an obligation to conform to all of expectations that 
were in effect before any of the modulations started. On the contrary, 
at any time there are a number of people who are, to a greater or 
lesser degree, modulating, there are other people who are, to a greater 
or lesser degree, resisting the modulation, and there are still others 
who are marking time, hoping that the modulation will either succeed or 
fail before they have to act. 
The modulators may be scattered; they may never actually meet 
each other. But to the extent that each individual modulator writes 
letters to the press, solicits funds from his neighbors, make speeches 
• • • his behavior fits a pattern of cooperation with the other 
individual modulators. They form a group whose members expect each 
other to continue to write, to solicit and to speak. Even two or three 
gathered together in the name of some cause they believe in are enough 
to constitute a group, providing that, as with St. John Chrysostom, 
they believe in it passionately. Groups are generated by intensity of 
comnlitment as well as by propinquity or by frequency and variety of 
meetings. And groups generated by intensity of commitment, however 
numerically small, will have social expectations for their members, 
based on some pattern of cooperation into which their behavior fits, to 
which these members respond. Indeed~ in accordance with what I have 
said about the distinction between moral and social norms being a 
function of strength of feeling, in the case of small groups of 
modulators the expectations much are stronger and the responses more 
intense than in the case of (say) social clubs. 
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But, I will be reminded, before two or three can be gathered 
together in the name of a cause, there must be a very first modulator, 
a very first abolitionist. You can hardly claim, this critic will 
continue, that the first abolitionist's obligation to free slaves 
(which you admit he has when he is joined by even one other 
abolitionist) comes into being only when they join forces. 
Well, that is what I am saying. But to begin with, I am not 
persuaded that there ever was, or could be, a first abolitionist. The 
argument that there must be one, is plausible only if we adopt a 
synchronic view of time and first take a slice in which there are no 
abolitionists and then a slice in which there are, say, three. Then it 
seems to us that if we were to take slices between these two slices we 
would come across a slice in which there are two and finally a slice in 
which there is but one. The real world does not seem to me very much 
like that; people do not "become" abolitionists in the way in which the 
room becomes illuminated a light switch is flipped, and to argue that 
there must be a first abolitionist is like arguing that there must be a 
first chicken (alternatively, a first egg). The reply is that, last as 
chickens and eggs evolved together out of a simpler reproductive 
system, so full-fledged, and so noticed, abolitionists emerged out of 
unnoticed, smaller-scale modulators. 
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But assume for the sake of argument a time-slice view of things 
and suppose ourselves to have found the first--the very first--
abolitionist situated in a world of slavery supporters. He may be 
first, but if he has memory and imagination he is not alone. He is 
united with illustrious predecessors--Aristotle, who, though certainly 
only a very cautious modulator, was critical of slavery; Jesus, who, 
though he did not talk about slavery, possibly regarding it as 
something to be rendered unto Caesar, can hardly have viewed it 
favorably. And he is united in anticipation and hope with 
successors and supporters. So this first abolitionist is very much a 
member of a group, a company of saints. It may seem to us, time-slice 
people that we are, that he is only remembering a past that is finished 
and looking forward to a future that is not yet--not much of a company, 
we may say. But that company is phenomenologically present now, in his 
so-called "specious" present, which is not at all specious to him. 
Accordingly, we can account socially for the obligation felt by that 
very first abolitionist in exactly the same way that we account for the 
obligation to row that is felt by the person sitting beside me in the 
boat and holding an oar. 
And, finally, to return to the claim that my reduced account of 
obligation is inadequate because duties have their source in ideal 
transcendental norms, not in actual operative norms: we need only to 
distinguish between the actual norm of some social group and the actual 
norm of a subgroup that is out of phase with the larger group. The so-
called transcendental norm is simply the modulation that some group or 
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other is proposing. It looks transcendental and ideal only because one 
is ignoring the context of modulating opinion in which it is actually 
emerging. 
Thus what we have found to be true of the putative first 
modulator is true of any critic of the reduced view who insists that it 
must be mistaken because Americans, say, had an obligation to free 
slaves before anyone, even Blacks, even the first abolitionist, had 
conceived the idea that slaves ought to be free. Such a critic 
doubtlessly believes himself to be in a different time slice from the 
time slice occupied by the institution of slavery; believing himself 
outside he believes himself to be evaluating slavery "objectively." 
But there is a great difference between feeling that slavery is hateful 
and feeling that slaves ought to be free. The feeling that slavery is 
hateful is something that anybody can experience from any time slice. 
The fact that my critic feels not only that slavery is hateful but also 
that slaves ought to be free shows him to be, not outside the time 
slice containing the institution of slavery but very much inside it, 
united in memory and anticipation with those early abolitionists and 
responding sympathetically to their expectations for him. He is so 
keenly aware of his response--so keenly aware that slaves ought to be 
free--that he quite fails to notice that he is responding to, 
resonating with, those expectations. Thus the obligation that critics 
of my reduced view feel people have to change a social norm (say, 
slavery), like the obligation that the putative first abolitionist felt 
and like the obligation the public has eventually come to feel to 
accept the changed norm, is not something in rerum naturam; it is 
something "felt in the mind"--in this case the mind of my critics 
themselves--as a result of their having internalized the norm of some 
social group. 
v. 
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If this long argument be accepted everything that can be said 
about moral obligation--including what is said about obligation being 
independent of roles--and that is ordinarily talked about in a special 
sort of "moral" language can also be talked about in the reduced 
language of social roles, role modulations, and role expectations. 
Nevertheless, though everything that can be said in either language can 
be said in the other, some people will prefer one language and other 
people the other, the situation being similar to Wittgenstein's 
duck/rabbit drawing,lO where although every duck-feature is also a 
rabbit-feature and every rabbit-feature is a duck-feature, some people 
see a duck and others a rabbit. 
For my part, I prefer the reduced language because, on my 
system of cost-accounting, one gains more by using it than one loses--
the reduced language focuses attention, as it were, on a fascinating 
duck bill instead of on a rather dull pair of rabbit's ears. That is 
to say, it focuses attention on understanding why people feel committed 
to some course of action, on understanding why modulators modulate, why 
resisters resist, why modulations that we hoped would succeed peter 
out, why those we hoped would fade away take on. • • • In contrast, 
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the moral principle language, by focussing attention on what "really" 
means in the question, "What ought people really do?" distracts 
attention from such matters. That, at least to me, is a heavy cost. 
But even I will admit that the moral principle language nevertheless 
has one advantage. Presumably speakers of both languages believe 
morals are important; otherwise they would not talk about them. The 
moral principle language makes morals sound important; that the reduced 
language does not do. 
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9. Mr. Justice Baze10n's address at the 1981 annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association is a good example of the way a 
modulation can start. Relying on his long experience hearing 
cases in which psychological "experts" testify, the judge 
discussed what he called the "sins" of the profession: a tendency 
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facts under their conclusions" and "the values underlying their 
choice of facts," and a failure to "come clean on the 
uncertainties of opinion that may exist. " The fact that 
extensive excerpts from the address were printed in the APA 
Monitor, (vol. 12, no. 10) shows that this modulation is beginning 
to spread, though it is far from clear that it will eventually 
take on. 
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